According to Mediaite, Judge Tanya Chutkan, unswayed by former President Donald Trump’s accusations against Mark Meadows, boldly reinstated a gag order in a decisive ruling that meticulously dismantled Trump’s legal defense team’s arguments. The order was reinstated on Sunday following a period of legal back-and-forth, including a temporary stay at Trump’s request, during which the judge deliberated on whether to lift the order pending an appeal.
In her scathing decision, Judge Chutkan systematically debunked each of the defense’s assertions, notably Trump’s baseless claims that the order violated his First Amendment rights. Emphasizing the principle that the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings must yield to the orderly administration of justice, the judge underscored the paramount importance of fair trials not only for the defendant but also for the government and the public at large.
The judge also appeared to mock the defense’s reliance on dictionary definitions, highlighting that legal terms such as “interested party” carry distinct legal meanings beyond general language definitions. Furthermore, she pointed out the inadequacy of solely citing dictionary entries in determining the breadth of the gag order.
Highlighting Trump’s subsequent social media posts before and after the stay, the judge illuminated the stark contrast in their compliance with the gag order, particularly drawing attention to Trump’s unwarranted attack on Meadows, which the judge deemed a blatant violation of the order.
Despite the judge’s detailed explanation and clear demarcation of the order’s parameters, Trump continued to vehemently criticize the ruling in the following days. Nevertheless, Judge Chutkan remained resolute in her decision, firmly denying Trump’s motion to stay and lifting the administrative stay initially imposed in her October 20, 2023 Minute Order.
As the court has explained, the First Amendment rights of participants in criminal proceedings must yield, when necessary, to the orderly administration of justice—a principle reflected in Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Local Criminal Rules.
…And contrary to Defendant’s argument, the right to a fair trial is not his alone, but belongs also to the government and the public … (emphasizing “the State’s interest in fair trials”); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 667 (10th Cir. 1969) (“The public has an overriding interest that justice be done in a controversy between the government and individuals and has the right to demand and expect ‘fair trials designed to end in just judgments.’ This objective may be thwarted unless an order against extrajudicial statements applies to all parties to a controversy. The concept of a fair trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense.” (internal citations omitted)).
Defendant’s repeated appeals to broad First Amendment values therefore ignore that the court—pursuant to its obligation to protect the integrity of these proceedings—recognized those values but, in balancing them against thepotential prejudice resulting from certain kinds of statements, found them outweighed.
Defendant quotes Merriam-Webster Online’s definition of “interested” to conclude that the term “interested parties” includes could include “everyone ‘affected’ by or ‘involved’ in the case.” Motion to Stay at 26. But “interested party” is a well-established legal term of art meaning “anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment.”
… Defendant focuses on the prohibition of “targeting” certain individuals, again quoting various dictionary definitions to assert that targeting could include not only identifying those individuals, but also attacking them, subjecting them to ridicule or criticism, or otherwise attempting to affect them. Motion to Stay at 25. But “restating a dictionary” to “search . . . for every facet” of relevant terms is not a proper vagueness inquiry. United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “Rather, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if, applying the rules for interpreting legal texts, its meaning ‘specifie[s]’ ‘no standard of conduct . . . at all.’” Id. at 1107 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). And a cardinal rule of interpretation is that context matters; “a word is known by the company it keeps.”…
The motion hearing and corresponding Order provide substantial context for and examples of the kinds of “targeting” statements that could result in “significant and immediate risk[s]” to “the integrity of these proceedings.”
